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Religious Differences in Electoral Turnout among Women in 
Northern Ireland 
Abstract 
It is now commonly accepted that democratic elections with increased female 
participation and representation is an essential element of peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies. Yet, women are not a monolithic group and their needs are not 
homogeneous. This is especially the case in post-conflict societies marked by long-
standing ethno-national antagonisms, where issues surrounding female unity and 
women’s political participation are often considered secondary to resolving the 
national identity question. Using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election 
Survey, this paper examines female differences in electoral turnout between the two 
main religious groupings – Protestant and Catholic – in Northern Ireland. The results 
suggest the existence of a significant religious gap in electoral turnout among women, 
with Catholic women been significantly more likely to vote than Protestant women.  
A key factor in accounting for this phenomenon is differences in political engagement 
and levels of trust in political leaders.   
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Introduction 
Political participation and electoral turnout are considered the life blood of a healthy 
democracy. This is particularly the case in transitional societies where the 
participation of citizens in elections is viewed an indispensable tool not only for the 
confirmation of the new political order and its leaders but also for the development of 
democratic politics.  As a number of commentators point out, not only are elections a 
major factor in the stabilisation and democratisation of emerging democracies and 
post-conflict societies but they have been increasingly included as a key aspect of 
negotiated peace agreements aimed at terminating civil wars (Lyons, 2005; Harbom et 
al., 2006; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2010). In fact, elections have been central to virtually 
every negotiated settlement since the end of the Cold war and are now considered an 
essential requirement for internationally supported post-conflict state-building 
(Bjornlund, 2004; Bjornlund et al., 2007; Kelley, 2012).  Although both the timing 
and type of electoral system is open to some dispute, it has now generally accepted 
that the undertaking of fair and free elections – the ‘bullets to ballots’ approach – is 
vital for the transition to a democratic and peaceful society (Paris, 2004; Mansfield 
and Snyder, 2005;  Reilly, 2008; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012).  
Yet, what we know about the long-term consequences of elections for the 
advancement of democracy and political stability in emerging democracies and post-
conflict societies is both contradictory and somewhat limited.  While some studies 
point to their democratic enhancing qualities (Linberg, 2006), particularly when 
combined with power-sharing and a negotiated peace settlement (Hoddie and Hartzell, 
2005; Brancati and Synder, 2012), others highlight their conflict-regenerating 
properties, most notably in the immediate aftermath of war (Paris, 2004), while still 
others stress their long-term regressive tendencies, such as declining levels in turnout 
and the subsequent undermining of democracy (Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova and 
Power, 2007; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 2013). Moreover, in the vast majority of 
cases, it is the influence of institutional factors – such as the electoral system – at the 
aggregate level which has been the focus of attention. By contrast, individual 
characteristics of ordinary citizens have rarely been investigated. This is particularly 
the case when the influence of gender is considered. Furthermore, the few studies that 
do exist tend to focus on the gender gap in electoral participation rather than 
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differences between women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Coffe and Bolzendahl, 
2011).  
The absence of such research may be considered surprising for the following 
reasons. First, it is now increasingly recognised that the political contribution of 
women is vital for the successful and peaceful transition of societies emerging from 
conflict. A view that has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations Security 
Council in a series of resolutions on Women and Peace and Security advocating 
women’s full and equal participation in both the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
as well as in all areas of peacebuilding, including electoral processes and 
constitutional reform.1 Second, it is important to note, however, as proponents of 
intersectionality suggest,2 women do not form a politically monolithic group.  As a 
number of studies have shown, not only are women divided by a range of factors – 
such as class, race, age, and religion – in terms of their electoral turnout and party 
preferences in established Western democracies (Campbell, 2012; Huddy et al., 2008; 
Carroll, 2014; MacManus, 2014) but this is also the case in many post-conflict 
societies where women are often sharply differentiated both by long-standing ethnic 
loyalties as well as unequal access to resources (Waylen, 2007; Baur, 2009; 
Hassenstab and Ramet, 2015). Not all political analysts, however, endorse this view, 
most notably when post-conflict societies in Africa are considered.  As a number of 
scholars have noted, not only have many post-conflict African countries, particularly 
since the 1990s, seen major advancements in women’s political representation but 
there is also evidence to suggest that these female representatives have sought 
alliances that cut across ethnic, religious and class differences to ensure the successful 
passage of legislative reforms concerning the rights of women (Arostegui, 2013; 
Tripp, 2015).  
It is with these considerations in mind that this study focuses on differences in 
electoral turnout among women in Northern Ireland. The article proceeds in two 
stages. First it focuses on the political participation of women in Northern Ireland, 
particularly in the post-accord period. Building on this analytical discussion and using 
nationally representative data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election 
Survey,3 it examines differences between the two main religious groupings – Catholic 
and Protestant – in electoral turnout among women.  Religious differences rather than 
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differences in communal affiliation – nationalist versus unionist – were chosen as the 
primary distinguishing variable of interest because of the relatively large number of 
women – 38.2 per cent in this instance – who were unwilling to endorse a nationalist 
or a unionist label, the majority of whom belonged to the Protestant tradition.4  More 
importantly, however, and as in previous elections, religious background remained the 
primary determinant of voting during the 2015 Northern Ireland Westminster election 
(Tonge and Evans, 2015). Moreover, in this instance, its influence was further 
reinforced by the introduction of unionist electoral pacts in four constituencies where, 
contrary to expectations, turnout actually increased by an average of 3.5 per cent.5 As 
Tonge and Evans (2015:131) put it: ‘The election amply demonstrated how the 
linkage between religious community background and voting patterns remain the 
strongest in Europe.’  
The use of Northern Ireland as a case study may be considered particularly 
appropriate for the following three reasons. First, the Northern Ireland peace accord, 
based on consociational power-sharing, is now considered an exemplar of conflict 
management throughout the world.   Second, at least as far as these consociational 
power-sharing forms of governance are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that 
women are often ill-served by such arrangements, where gender equality and the 
political rights of women is often sacrificed in the interests of resolving communal 
identity (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012).  Finally, unlike previous studies which have 
focused on gender and peace settlements in countries transitioning to democracy, 
Northern Ireland offers a unique opportunity to investigate not only differences in 
electoral turnout among women but also in a society where they have been deeply 
divided by protracted ethno-national conflict.  
Women, Political Participation and the Northern Ireland Agreement 
Signed in April 1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement sought to bring to an end 
almost 30 years of violent conflict. Based on a consociational model of conflict 
regulation and the principle of ‘parity in esteem’, a key assumption of the Agreement 
was that long-standing and entrenched communal divisions could be accommodated 
and eventually ameliorated through institutional power-sharing arrangements. These 
power-sharing arrangements included the formation of a Northern Ireland Assembly 
with a power-sharing Executive, plus the introduction of a cross-community support 
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principle for any major decisions taken by the Assembly (Hayes and McAllister, 
2013).  
Although the Agreement was primarily designed as a mechanism to manage, 
and eventually alleviate ethnonational conflict, it was also the first political initiative 
to formally recognise women’s right to political inclusion, and committed the various 
parties to ensuring the ‘right of women to full and equal participation in political life.’ 
While this obligation concerning women’s political inclusion was not endorsed in the 
later St Andrews (2006) and Hillsborough (2010) agreements,6 in both the subsequent 
Stormont House (2015) and A Fresh Start: The Stormont Agreement and 
Implementation Plan (2015) agreements, the parties again pledged their commitment 
to the ‘advancement of women in public life.’ Finally, unlike other peace agreements 
where women are seldom at the negotiating table,7 the 1998 Northern Ireland 
Agreement did include the formal participation of women via the Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition (NIWC),8 although the final negotiations were exclusively male 
(Hayes and McAllister, 2012). In fact, the inclusion of the formal recognition of the 
political rights of women in the final draft of the Agreement was both initiated and 
secured by the NIWC (Fearon, 1999).  
Despite these obligations and commitments, the post-Agreement period has 
not proved conducive for the advancement of women. As a number of scholars point 
out, not only have women been disproportionately negatively affected by the 
previously highly ‘militarised nature’ of Northern Ireland, such as the rise in domestic 
violence and the lack of reproductive rights, but the political arena in particular has 
remained a ‘cold house’ for women (Jarman, 2004; Galligan, 2013; Horgan and 
O’Connor, 2014). Although female political representation has increased somewhat 
since 1998, it still remains low in comparison to Scotland and Wales9 and, with the 
exception of the Italian regional legislatures, it is still the lowest in Western Europe 
for comparable devolved institutions (Potter, 2013). Even the establishment and 
subsequent electoral success of the NIWC in both the 1996 Northern Ireland Forum 
and 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections was a very short-lived endeavour. 
Undermined by the consociational power-sharing arrangement and deserted by an 
increasingly polarised electorate – that returned both the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) and Sinn Fein as their primary ethnic party of choice – both representatives 
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failed to be re-elected in the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections and the party 
was formally disbanded in 2006 (Braniff and Whiting, 2015).   
There is also evidence to suggest that some of the main political parties have 
demonstrated a widespread lack of interest in promoting female participation and 
representation in politics (Matthews, 2014). Despite the progress made by some of the 
political parties, most notably the efforts of Sinn Fein to promote women into 
leadership roles, the political environment remains heavily male dominated and this is 
particularly the case when the gender composition of the unionist parties within the 
Northern Ireland Assembly is considered. Moreover, even with their electoral gains in 
the 2016 elections, women constitute only 21 per cent of the 38 Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLAs) within the DUP – the largest party in the Assembly and 
the main unionist party – while the equivalent proportion among Sinn Fein – the 
second largest and main nationalist party in the Assembly with 28 MLAs – is 
markedly highly at 36 per cent.  Moreover, unlike Sinn Fein which supports quotas to 
increase the number of female candidates, particularly in winnable seats, the DUP 
remains firmly opposed to such a policy.10  This view it should be noted is also held 
by the newly elected female leader of the DUP, Arlene Foster.11 Although there is 
some evidence to suggest greater support for increasing female political 
representation among more recent members, positive discrimination and quotas 
remains deeply opposed by most party members and elected representatives (Braniff 
and Whiting, 2015).  
In summary, despite its promise of a new beginning, the post-Agreement 
period has proved to be an inhospitable place for women and this is particularly the 
case when the political arena is considered. In comparison to their male counterparts, 
political apathy among women remains widespread as does their greater lack of 
support for the new political arrangements and accompanying lower levels of trust in 
their political leaders (Gormley-Heenan and Devine, 2010; Hayes and McAllister, 
2012). Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that political disillusionment is 
more prevalent among women from within the unionist tradition, particularly when 
attitudes towards devolved government are considered, where female political 
representation continues to lag significantly behind that of their nationalist counter-
parts (Hayes and McAllister, 2012). As a number of commentators have noted, 
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although ethnic identity remains the dominant cleavage within this society, nationalist 
parties, for the most part, have a far better track-record in promoting gender policies, 
particularly the political representation of women, than that of their unionist 
counterparts (Matthews, 2014; Baniff and Whiting, 2015).  
Women and Electoral Turnout 
A cornerstone of the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement was the enhanced political 
participation of women. However, as noted earlier, much of the post-Agreement 
period has been characterised by an increase in female apathy and a lack of political 
representation and support for its political institutions.  To what extent is this also the 
case when electoral participation is considered? Furthermore, are there any notable 
differences between women in relation to this issue?  
Table 1 addresses this question using the 2015 Northern Ireland Election 
Survey. The results are clear. Although a clear majority of the female electorate – or 
62 per cent, in this instance – turned out to vote, as a group, it is Catholic women who 
are notably more likely to do so than Protestant women. More specifically, whereas 
70 per cent of Catholic women claimed to have voted in the 2015 Westminster 
election, the equivalent figure among Protestant women was markedly lower at just 55 
per cent, or a religious gap of 15 percentage points.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this religious gap in greater 
electoral turnout among Catholic women is a relatively recent phenomenon which 
dates from 1998 onwards. As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, whereas electoral 
turnout was higher among Protestant women than Catholic women – 82 per cent as 
compared to 75 per cent – during the 1992 election, by 1998, the pattern had reversed.  
In 1998, 78 per cent of Protestant women as compared to 86 per cent of Catholic 
women claimed to have voted in the Northern Ireland Assembly election. While this 
gap in electoral turnout in favour of Catholic women remained relatively stable over 
the following decade – hovering around 8 percentage points – by 2015, it had almost 
doubled to 15 per cent. 
[Insert Table 2] 
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It is important to note, however, that this religious gap in turnout among 
women is not only greater than the religious gap among men but also than the gap in 
turnout between the two religious communities as a whole. As the data in Table 2 also 
demonstrates, whereas Catholic men were notably less likely to vote than Protestant 
men both prior to and in the immediate post-Agreement period, by 2011, electoral 
turnout rates among Catholic men outstripped those of their Protestant equivalents by 
a margin of 12 per cent.12 Although the gap has narrowed considerably since then – 
73 per cent as compared to 70 per cent during the most recent 2015 Westminster 
election – Catholic men are still somewhat more likely to turn out to vote than 
Protestant men. Finally, when differences between the two religious communities are 
investigated, there is again evidence to suggest that since 1998, electoral turnout has 
become an increasingly Catholic phenomenon.  As the data in Table 2 also shows 
while Protestants were more likely to vote than Catholics in the pre-Agreement period 
they were somewhat less likely to do so at the turn of the century; 74 per cent of 
Protestants as compared to 77 per cent of Catholics claimed to have voted in the 2003 
Assembly elections. Since then levels of electoral participation have eroded 
significantly among Protestants. In 2015, while 72 per cent of Catholics claimed to 
have cast their vote, the equivalent figure among Protestants was just 62 per cent, or a 
religious gap of 10 percentage points.13  
In summary, the results are clear. While traditionally electoral turnout was 
higher among Protestants than Catholics, it is now Catholics, and not Protestants, who 
are more likely to turn out to vote.  It is important to note, however, that this lack of 
electoral participation among Protestants has become a predominantly female 
phenomenon. At just 55 per cent in the most recent Northern Ireland Westminster 
election, currently not only are turnout rates among women in the Protestant 
community significantly lower than those within either the male or female Catholic 
population – 70 per cent and 73 per cent, respectively – as well as those among the 
Catholic population as a whole (72 per cent), but also as compared to those of 
Protestant men (70 per cent).  
 
Explaining Religious Differences in Female Electoral Turnout 
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There are several possible explanations as to why Protestant women are less likely to 
vote than Catholic women, the most obvious being there differing levels of support 
for devolved government. As noted earlier, it is this factor – a greater lack of support 
for the Northern Ireland Assembly and particularly for its power-sharing executive – 
which not only accounts for the gender gap in levels of support for devolution within 
both religious communities but also for the greater lack of support among Protestant 
women as compared to their female Catholic counterparts (Hayes and McAllister, 
2012). The results in Table 3 lend some further support to these findings. As a group, 
it is Protestant women who stand out as the least positive or, in this instance, the most 
indifferent in their views and this is particularly the case when attitudes towards 
power-sharing arrangements are considered. For example, whereas 68 per cent of 
Protestant women as compared to 70 per cent of Catholic women supported the 
Assembly/Executive, the equivalent figures among those who adopted an indifferent 
position – neither supported or opposed – was 28 per cent and 23 per cent 
respectively. An even more pronounced pattern emerges when attitudes towards 
power-sharing are considered. While only 59 per cent of Protestant women as 
compared to 77 per cent of Catholic women endorsed power-sharing, over a third of 
Protestants and just under a fifth of Catholics within the female population expressed 
indifference in terms of their views.14  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
There is also evidence to suggest that this religious gap in level of female 
support has decreased overtime. This pattern holds regardless of whether support for 
the Assembly/Executive or attitudes towards power-sharing are considered.  As the 
data in Table 4 demonstrates, while levels of support for the Northern Ireland 
Assembly/Executive among the female Protestant and Catholic population were 80 
per cent and 87 per cent, respectively in 1998, or a gap of 7 percentage points in 
favour of Catholic women, by 2015, the equivalent figures were 68 per cent and 70 
per cent, or a gap of just two percentage points. An even more pronounced pattern is 
echoed when attitudes towards power-sharing are examined. In 1998, while 86 per 
cent of Catholic women as compared to just 59 per cent of Protestant women 
supported such arrangements, or a gap of 27 percentage points, the equivalent figures 
in 2015 were 77 and 59 per cent, respectively, or a gap of 18 percentage points. This 
 11 
    
is not to discount, however, the notable decline in the level of support for power-
sharing among Catholic women. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
A second possible explanation for the lack of Protestant female electoral 
engagement is their greater lack of party attachment and trust in political leaders. 
However, previous research in relation to this issue is somewhat contradictory and 
mixed. While some studies find no notable differences among women in relation to 
both these issues (Gormley-Heenan and Devine, 2010), others suggest a differential 
effect with greater levels of political engagement among Catholic women but 
comparatively higher levels of trust in their political leaders among women within the 
Protestant community (Hayes and McAllister, 2012).  
The results in Table 5 lend some partial support to these previous findings, 
with Protestant women being the least politically engaged in their views. While just 
two-fifths of Protestant women claimed to have a party identification, 46 per cent of 
Catholic shared this view.15 It is important to note, however, there is evidence to 
suggest that this greater party attachment among Catholic women is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, which dates from the turn of the century. Previous Northern Ireland 
election survey data indicates that whereas 46 per cent of Protestant women as 
compared to 42 per cent of Catholic women claimed a party attachment in 1998, by 
2001, 43 per cent of Protestant women as compared to 48 per cent of Catholic women 
reported such a view.  
[Insert Table 5] 
A similar, albeit more pronounced, pattern emerges when trust in political 
leaders is considered, with Protestant women being the least trusting in their views. 
Whereas just under half of Protestant women claimed to have some trust in both 
political leaders – Peter Robinson and Martin McGuiness – the equivalent percentage 
among Catholic women was 15 percentage points higher at 64 per cent. There were 
also major religious differences in views in relation to this issue with, as expected, 
each leader being held in a much more positive light by members of their own 
community than the opposing one. This is not to deny, however, the much higher 
levels of support among Catholic women for Martin McGuinness as compared to that 
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for Peter Robinson among women within the Protestant community.  While less than 
half of all Protestant women claimed to have some trust in Peter Robinson, the 
equivalent proportion among Catholic women in relation to Martin McGuinness was 
significantly higher at 63 per cent. Moreover, while a notable minority of Catholic 
women, or around a fifth in this instance, were willing to place their trust in Peter 
Robinson, levels of trust among Protestant women are an almost exclusively Peter 
Robinson phenomenon.16  
    It is important to note, however, that this female differential in trust between the 
two political leaders is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from the previous 
election. As the data in Table 6 demonstrates, while levels of trust in both political 
leaders among Catholic women has risen considerably – from 39 per cent to 64 per 
cent – since the last Westminster election in 2010, they have declined – from 56 to 49 
per cent – among women in the Protestant community. These patterns are replicated 
when levels of trust towards the two political leaders are considered separately. 
Although trust ratings for Peter Robinson and especially Martin McGuinness rose 
sharply among women within the Catholic community, they experienced a consistent, 
albeit moderate, decline among Protestant women. The growing lack of trust 
particularly in Peter Robinson among Protestant women is, perhaps, not an 
unexpected finding, given the various political scandals – allegations of financial 
corruption and his wife’s affair with a teenager – which led to his temporary 
resignation as First Minister in January 2010 and, according to some political pundits, 
the surprising loss of his Westminster seat in May 2010 (McKittrick, 2010).17   
[Table 6 about here] 
The Religious Gap in Female Electoral Turnout: Assessing the Explanations 
There are, then, two possible explanations that could account for the greater electoral 
participation of Catholic women, each of which demonstrates a degree of empirical 
support at least at the bivariate level: attitudes towards devolution/system of 
governance and levels of political engagement/trust in leaders. In each case, Catholic 
women are more supportive and engaged than Protestant women. To what extent do 
these two explanations account for female differences in electoral turnout once a wide 
range of other factors are taken into account? Table 7 addresses this question. To 
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assess the two explanations, four logistic regression models are estimated: Model 1 
which shows the effect of religion on female electoral turnout; Model 2 which shows 
the estimate for religion, controlling for socio-economic background and national 
identity; Models 3 and 4 which show the religion effect when the influence of our two 
explanations – support for devolution/systems of governance and party 
attachment/trust in its political leaders – are also taken into account. The figures in 
each model are the parameter estimates, while the standard errors for each of the 
estimations are shown in parentheses. Finally, the ‘odds ratio’ statistics shows 
whether the impact of both the control and explanatory variables increases (score 
greater than 1) or decreases (score less than 1) the likelihood of electoral turnout in 
this instance.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 The results lends some partial support to our hypothesis concerning the impact 
of both factors – attitudes towards political institutions and party support/trust in 
political leaders – on religious differences in female electoral turnout. As the data in 
Table 7 demonstrates, although religion has an independent and statistically 
significant effect on electoral turnout, an effect that remains when a range of socio-
economic control variables and national identity  (Model 2) as well as attitudes 
towards the political institutions (Model 3) are included in the logistic regression 
analysis, these statistically significant differences no longer hold when party support 
and attitudes towards political leaders are also added to the investigation.18  
Focusing initially on Model 1, the results are clear. Religion demonstrates a 
statically significantly effect on electoral turnout. More specifically, Catholic women 
are almost twice as likely as Protestant women – the odds ratio is 1.94 – to turn out to 
vote. An almost identical result emerges when a range of socio-economic control 
variables and national identity are included in the logistic regression analysis (see 
Model 2). Religion is again a significant predictor of electoral turnout with Catholic 
women being, in this instance, over twice as likely as Protestant women – the odds 
ratio is 2.20 – to turn out to vote, net of all other factors. This is not to suggest that 
religion is the only significant determinant of electoral behaviour in this instance. 
Other notable determinants include the positive effects of church attendance, age, and 
having a tertiary education.  Regular church attenders, older individuals and the well-
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educated are significantly more likely to turn out to vote than irregular attenders, the 
young, and the lesser-educated.  
A similar pattern emerges when the influence of attitudes towards political 
institutions – – support for devolution/systems of governance – are also included in 
the analysis (see Model 3). Religion is again a statistically significant predictor of 
electoral turnout.  More specifically, Catholic women are again over twice as likely as 
Protestant women – the odds ratio is 2.35– to turn out to vote, net of all other factors.  
As in our earlier analysis, other notable predictors include the positive effects of age 
and completing a tertiary education, as well as holding a positive view of the 
Assembly/Executive. In fact, women who endorsed the Assembly/Executive were 
almost twenty more times likely net of all other factors to turn out to vote than those 
who did not. 
Finally, when the influence of both party support and trust in political leaders 
is added to the analysis, religion is not a significant predictor of electoral turnout (see 
Model 4).  Rather the key net predictors of electoral turnout in this instance are both 
partisanship and trust in political leaders. Whereas women who had a party 
attachment were almost eight times more likely – the odds ratios  is 7.54 – to turn out 
to vote than those who did not, women who claimed to have trust in the two main 
political leaders – Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness – were nearly four times 
more likely to do so than those who did not.  This is not to discount, however, the 
continuing independent and positive net effect of support for the Assembly.  
However, at least as far as religious differences in female electoral participation in 
Northern Ireland is concerned, the results suggest that it is the addition of these two 
factors – party attachment and trust in political leaders – which explains the religion 
gap in voting behaviour among women.  Once these two factors are included in the 
analysis, religion is no longer a significant net predictor of electoral participation 
among women. In other words and in comparison to their female Catholic counter-
parts, it is their greater political disengagement, both in terms of their party 
attachment and their trust in political leaders, which accounts for the significantly 
lower electoral participation rates among Protestant women in this instance.  
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Conclusion 
Over the last few decades, the role of elections and electoral turnout in 
emerging democracies and post-conflict societies has received increasing research 
attention. In fact, the holding of elections and the electoral participation of its citizens 
is now considered a key factor in ensuring the stability and legitimacy of the new 
political arrangement. Yet, what we know about the long-terms consequences of 
electoral participation for post-conflict societies remain both limited and 
contradictory, especially when differences among women are considered. Despite 
increasing recognition as to the importance of the political contribution of women for 
the successful transition of societies emerging from conflict, the electoral mobilisation 
of citizens along ethnic and/or religious lines and the calculation of the 
‘ethnic/religious headcount’ has dominated the political agenda.  This is particularly 
the case when consociational forms of power-sharing arrangements are considered, 
where women’s electoral participation and support for these new political 
arrangements is considered of secondary significance at best if not totally irrelevant.  
As McGarry and O’Leary (2009: 82) put it: ‘As for the suggestion that consociational 
politics promotes a superficial ethno-national politics at the expense of more popular 
questions of class or gender, we submit that there is no evidence, either from public 
opinion or from elections, that the latter questions are more popular… Elections in 
Northern Ireland are free and fair, and turnouts are reasonably high when compared to 
other democratic jurisdictions, so the lack of support for class-based or gender-based 
parties cannot be explained by undemocratic structural impediments or by the 
presence of a large section of the electorate that does not vote.’  
The results of this investigation calls into question this assertion and points to 
the need to include gender as an additional key component in consociational power-
sharing arrangements.  First, our results confirm the existence of a significant 
religious gap in women’s electoral participation. Protestant women are notably less 
like to turn out to vote than Catholic women. Second, these religious differences in 
turnout among women are not a recent phenomenon or just a by-product of one 
particular election – the 2015 Westminster election – but date from 1998 onwards, 
and coincide with the first assembly elections based on the consociational power-
sharing arrangements.  Third, this religious gap in turnout among women is not only 
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greater than the religious gap among men but also than the gap in turnout between the 
two religious communities as a whole. Fourth, while only future research can 
determine the extent to which this female gap in turnout between the two communities 
continues for the foreseeable future, particularly in the light of diminishing turnout 
among the nationalist community and the increasing political representation of 
unionist women, the notable size of the gap suggests that it will remain for some time 
to come. Thus, contrary to the gender-blind assertions of consociational theorists, 
mechanisms to deal with the  democratic deficit among Protestant women, or their 
much higher rates of abstention, must now lie at the very heart of Northern Ireland’s 
politics, including its consociational power-sharing arrangements. 
Our results also confirm the importance of two key factors in consociational 
power-sharing arrangements – party attachment and trust in their political leaders – in 
accounting for the religious gap in turnout among women. More so than any other 
issue, it was the greater antipathy among Protestant women towards the primary 
political agents involved in the electoral process – political parties and their leaders – 
which accounted for their higher rates of abstention.  Again, there is evidence to 
suggest that this antipathy among Protestant women in terms of their political 
attachments is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from the turn of the century. 
What may account for these findings? One explanation is the differing responses of 
the parties and their leaders to the political role of women. As noted earlier, although 
ethnic divisions eclipse all other cleavages within this society, nationalist parties have 
been much more proactive in promoting gender policies, particularly the political 
representation of women, than that of their unionist counterparts. Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that this lack of female political representation is it odds with the 
preferences of the female Protestant population at large (Baniff and Whiting, 2015).  
This is not to deny, however, the potential ability of consociational power-
sharing arrangements to accommodate female political participation and gender 
equality more generally. As Byrne and McCullock (2012: 566) point out: ‘there is 
nothing inherent in power-sharing that cannot be made more democratic and inclusive 
of women.’ However, the willingness and ability of political parties and their leaders 
to address this female representation issue and mobilise the electorate around such 
cross-cutting allegiances, including gender equality, will not be an easy task (Kennedy 
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et al., 2016).  Given the current dominance of ethno-nationalism as the singular mark 
of division within the formal political structures and the use of the ballot box as the 
sole measure of political legitimacy, both a major revision of the underlying political 
arrangements and the introduction of mechanisms to actively promote the inclusion 
and participation of women are needed. However, as Byrne and McCullough (2012) 
also point out, such revisions and mechanisms to both accommodate and increase 
female political representation and participation will not be enough. As a number of 
commentators have also noted, what is further required is much greater attention to 
the gendered nature of the conflict, including the reproduction of patriarchal privilege 
in consociational post-conflict political institutions and their power-sharing practices 
(Galligan, 2006, 2013; Byrne and McCullock, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2016).  
  These results have a number of implications for other societies emerging 
from deep-seated ethnic and/or religious conflict. First, post-conflict scholars must 
address the relationship between conflict and gender. Despite the claims of 
consociational scholars, the impact of such power-sharing agreements is not a gender-
neutral activity.  Second, greater consideration should be paid to the differential 
experience of women in post-conflict societies.  As a number of scholars point out, 
women are not a homogeneous group. This is particularly so in post-conflict societies, 
where women remain deeply divided by differing ethnic allegiances. Finally, the 
results point to the crucial role of both political parties and their leaders in 
determining female political participation in the post-accord period. While much 
attention has been paid to the role of political parties in strengthening or moderating 
ethnic identities and tribalism among voters via such consociational power-sharing 
arrangements, their role in perpetuating gender inequality and enhancing divisions 
among women, by contrast, is much neglected.  As the scholarship on intersectionality 
illustrates, ethnically-divided parties may not only undermine the political 
participation of women, but by putting ethnicity and gender in conflict, they can 
create a culture of division which subverts not only gender equality but also the 
political rights of all women.  
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Endnotes 
1  To date, the United Nations Security Council has passed eight resolutions under 
the international women, peace and security agenda – 1325 (2000); 1820 
(2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 
2242 (2015) – in relation to this issue. And, while the UK government has been 
at the forefront in promoting their implementation via the establishment of a 
National Action Plan (NAP), to date the experiences of women in Northern 
Ireland have been excluded from such plans as it does not consider the previous 
violence in Northern Ireland to be that of an ‘armed conflict.’ Moreover, 
although some progress has been made in relation to this issue, namely via the 
establishment of an All Party Group on UNSCR 1325 in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly in December 2010, attendance rates have been desultory and it lacks 
any statutory powers (Hoewer, 2013). 
2  Originally proposed by Black and other ethnic minority feminist scholars in the 
United States, in its most elementary form, intersectionality contends that the 
distinguishing categories within a society, such as gender, religion, 
race/ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, class, and other markers of identity and 
difference, do not function independently but, rather, act in tandem as 
interlocking or intersectional phenomena. Thus, a key focus of this approach is 
to investigate the intertwined nature of these identities both as a source of 
oppression as well as privilege (see Manuel, 2006). In fact, politicians have long 
been aware of this issue, namely the significant political diversity among groups 
of women by race, religion, generation and class, and have specifically designed 
electoral campaign strategies – such as the targeting of ‘mumsnet’ vote (middle 
income mothers) in the 2010 UK general election – on the basis of these 
differences.      
3  The 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey was a nationally representative post-
election survey of all adults aged 18 years or older conducted immediately after 
the May 2015 general election. Using face-to-face interviews and with a 
response rate of 68.3%, the survey was carried out by Social Market Research 
and based on a random sample of 1,810 adults. The 2015 Northern Ireland 
General Election Survey was collected by Jonathan Tonge, Jocelyn Evans, 
Bernadette C. Hayes, Paul Mitchell and Peter Shirlow and funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council.  
4  Moreover, when the relationship between religious identity, communal 
affiliation and electoral turnout was considered, it was Catholic women, albeit 
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among those who were willing to adopt a nationalist label, who were the most 
likely to cast their vote. For example, whereas 78.2 per cent of Catholic-
Nationalist women claimed to have turned out to vote, the equivalent figures 
among Protestant-Unionist women, and Catholic and Protestant women who 
were unwilling to adopt their respective communal affiliation were 72.8 per 
cent, 53.3 per cent and 23.4 per cent, respectively. 
5  While the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) stood aside for the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) in Fermanagh/South Tyrone and Newry/Armagh, the UUP did the 
same for the UUP in Belfast, East and North.  
6  In fact, with the one exception of a rather vague suggestion to establish a 
women’s prison in the Hillsborough agreement, neither the St Andrews 
Agreement nor the Hillsborough Agreement made any reference to women. 
7  For example, out of a sample of 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 
2011, only 4 per cent of signatories, 2.4 per cent of chief mediators and 9 per 
cent of negotiators were women (United Nations Women, 2012:3). And, while 
there is some evidence to suggest that, since the ratification of resolution 1325 
in 2000, peace agreements are more likely to contain specific references to 
women, they still only account for 16 per cent of all peace agreements (Bell and 
O’Rourke, 2010).   
8  Founded in 1996 to contest the elections to the Northern Ireland Forum –the 
multiparty talks which led to the Northern Ireland Agreement – the NIWC was a 
cross-communal and women-only political party established to represent the 
interests of women in the negotiations. 
9  Although there was a notable rise in the number of women elected to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly after the 2016 elections – 28 per cent, or 30 
members out of a total of 108 as compared to 19 per cent in 2011 – the 
percentage of female membership elected to the Scottish Parliament and the 
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11  Following the resignation of Peter Robinson – leader of the DUP and First 
Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly – Arlene Foster, albeit the sole 
candidate in the leadership contest, was elected leader of the DUP in December 
2015 and subsequently replaced Peter Robinson as First Minister in January 
2016.  
12  While part of this notable rise in voting apathy among Protestant males in 2011 
could be attributed to an extremely divisive and lack lustre election campaign by 
unionist politicians, particularly among those from within the UUP (Matthews, 
2011), this is not to discount the overall downward trend in turnout within the 
Protestant/unionist community, a pattern which is now replicated within the 
Catholic/nationalist population (Russell, 2016).  
13  While a breakdown in turnout rates by religion and gender is currently not 
available for the 2016 Assembly elections, official government figures suggest 
that the overall rate was 54.91 per cent, as compared to 58.4 per cent during the 
2015 Westminster elections.  
14   A somewhat different pattern emerges when male members of the two religious 
communities are considered. Although Catholic males were more supportive of 
power-sharing than Protestant males, Protestant men were the most supportive 
of the Assembly/Executive. More specifically, while 72 per cent of Catholic 
men as compared to 61 per cent of Protestant men endorsed power-sharing, the 
equivalent figures for support of the Assembly/Executive were 65 per cent and 
70 per cent, respectively.  
15  The equivalent figures among Protestant and Catholic men were somewhat 
higher and almost identical at 48 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively. 
16  A similar result emerges when the views of Catholic and Protestant men are 
considered, although the difference in levels of trust between the two 
communities is not as marked in this instance. For example, whereas 57 per cent 
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Protestant women considered the ‘issues surrounding Iris Robinson’ very 
important, only 27 per cent of Catholic women endorsed this opinion.  
18  Alternative analysis based on OLS with robust standard errors gave rise to an 
identical finding. An identical result emerged when the combined effect of 
religion and communal affiliation, or Catholic-Nationalist women, were used as 
the distinguishing category for investigation.  
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Table 1: Religious Differences in Electoral Turnout Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Catholic Protestant All 
    
Yes 70.4 55.4 61.8 
No 29.6 44.6 38.2 
(N) (324) (437) (761) 
 
Question: Did you manage to vote in the 2015 General (Westminster) election that was held 
recently. 
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015. 
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Table 2: The Religious Gap in Electoral Turnout, 1992-2015 
 
 1992 1998 2003 2011 2015 
Women -7 +8 +7 +8 +15 
Men -5 -7 -5 +12 +3 
All -7 +1 +3 +10 +10 
 
Note: The religious gap is the percentage of Catholics minus the percentage of Protestants 
who voted.  
 
Sources: 1992, 1998, 2003, 2011 and 2015 Northern Ireland Election Surveys. 
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Table 3: The Religious Differences in Support for Devolution Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Catholic  Protestant All 
    
Northern Ireland Assembly:   
Support  70.0 68.3 69.0 
Neither 22.7 28.3 25.9 
Oppose 7.3 3.4 5.0 
(N) (330) (445) (775) 
    
Power-Sharing:   
Support 77.3 59.1 66.9 
Neither  17.3 34.3 27.0 
Oppose 5.5 6.5 6.1 
(N) (330) (443) (773) 
 
Questions: And in terms of the current political arrangements, can you please tell me how you 
feel about the following: The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive; The requirement 
that Unionists and Nationalists share power.  
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015. 
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Table 4: The Religious Gap in Support for Devolution Among Women, 1998-2015 
 
 1998 2003 2010 2015 
NI Assembly & Executive +7 +11 +2 +2 
Power-Sharing +27 +24 +11 +18 
 
 
Note: The religious gap is the percentage of Catholic women minus the percentage of 
Protestant women who expressed ‘strong support’ or ‘support’.  
 
Sources: 1998, 2003, 2010 and 2015 Northern Ireland Election Surveys. 
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Table 5: The Religious Differences in Support for Political Parties and Trust in Leaders 
Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Catholic  Protestant All 
    
Partisanship:   
Yes 45.9 40.3 42.8 
 No 54.1 59.7 57.2 
[N] [320] [419] [739] 
    
Trust in Leaders:   
Peter Robinson/Martin McGuinness 64.4 49.2 55.7 
 (Peter Robinson)  (22.0) (48.2) (36.9) 
 (Martin McGuinness) (62.8) (7.0) (31.1) 
[N] [323] [427] [750] 
 
Questions: Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political party? 
Do you think of yourself as closer to one party in Northern Ireland than to others? ; On a 
scale of 0-10, where 0 means complete distrust in a leader and 10 means complete trust, 
please rate these leaders.  
Note: Trust in leaders is scored over 6 on the 0-10 scale.  
 
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015 
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Table 6: Changing Levels of Trust in Political Leaders Among Women 
 
 (Percentages) 
 2010  2015 Change 
    
Catholic:   
Peter Robinson/Martin McGuinness 38.9 64.4 +26 
 (Peter Robinson)  (13.9) (22.0)  (+8) 
 (Martin Mc Guinness) (35.6) (62.8) (+27) 
    
Protestant:   
Peter Robinson/Martin McGuinness 56.0 49.2 -7 
 (Peter Robinson)  (53.8) (48.2) (-6) 
 (Martin McGuinness) (12.4) (7.0) (-5) 
 
Sources: 2010 and 2015 Northern Ireland Election Surveys. 
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Table 7: Explaining the Religion Gap in Electoral Turnout Among Women (n=633) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
Est 
 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
Est 
 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
Est 
 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
Est 
 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Control variables:             
Marital status (single)     --- --- ---   -0.29 (0.23) 0.75   -0.24 (0.24) 0.78   -0.38 (0.29) 0.69 
Church attendance (attends)     --- --- ---    0.62* (0.31) 1.86    0.52 (0.33) 1.68    0.04 (0.37) 1.02 
Age (years)     --- --- ---    0.02* (0.01) 1.02    0.02* (0.01) 1.02    0.01 (0.01) 1.01 
Education:             
  Tertiary     --- --- ---    0.75* (0.33) 2.11    0.73* (0.34) 2.07    0.70 (0.39) 2.01 
  Secondary     --- --- ---    0.39 (0.26) 1.48    0.34 (0.27) 1.41    0.34 (0.32) 1.41 
  No qualificationa     --- --- ---          
Employment (labour active)     --- --- ---   -0.23 (0.19) 0.79   -0.22 (0.19) 0.80   -0.30 (0.23) 0.75 
Identity (British)       0.18 (0.27) 1.20    0.08 (0.28) 1.08   -0.19 (0.32) 0.83 
             
Political Institutions:            
Assembly (support)     --- ---     --- --- --- ---    2.98** (0.55) 19.75   2.08** (0.63) 7.98 
Power-sharing (support)     --- ---     --- --- --- ---   -0.23 (0.52)   0.79  -0.22 (0.62) 0.80 
             
Party Support and Trust in Political Leaders:          
Partisanship (yes)     --- ---     --- ---     --- --- ---     --- ---   2.02** (0.24) 7.54 
Robinson/McGuinness     --- ---     --- ---     --- --- ---     --- ---   1.38** (0.21) 3.98 
             
Religion Effect:             
Catholic  0.66** (0.17)    1.94    0.79**  (0.28) 2.20   0 .85**   (0.28) 2.35    0.47   (0.32) 1.60 
Constant    0.25*     -1.06*    -2.91**    -2.90**   
Nagelkerke R-Square    .033      .091     .179      .452   
 
Note: The dependent variable is coded 0 (not vote) and 1 (vote); Standard errors are in parentheses; a, omitted category of comparison, *, statistically significant at 
p<.05, **, p<.01.  
Source: Northern Ireland Election Survey, 2015. 
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